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The War of 1812 was one of the more unpopular wars in United 
States history, and active protest against it was evident from its inception. 
Centered primarily among New England Federalists, opposition took a 
variety of forms. Dissenting Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode 
Island governors obstructed the use of their states' militias for national 
service. The Federalist-controlled legislature of Massachusetts, seeking 
to undermine support for the conflict, advised citizens not to volunteer 
except for defensive wars. Town meetings and county conventions of-
fered memorials condemning the war while New England capitalists 
withheld funds. Federalist newspapers—a few going so far as to suggest 
New England secession—contributed to the discord. 
Such tactics seemed justifiable to those who considered England the 
guardian of civilization and France its despoiler, for America's apparent 
favoritism toward France confirmed Federalist suspicions that Madison's 
administration was an extension of European anarchy and atheism. 
Equally irritating, the war was an impediment to commercial interests 
that were heavily dependent on English trade. In addition Federalists 
found that their economic and ideological opposition had political 
significance. By 1814 every New England state was led by Federalists. 
"Madison's war," like Jefferson's embargo, accomplished for the party 
what it had been unable to do for itself. As a result, dissent was closely 
related to Federalist hopes of regaining their former power. 
Following the active protest of the first summer of war and until 
December, 1813, the voices of dissent seldom rose above a murmur. But 
when Madison proclaimed an embargo curtailing coastal trade, vociferous 
opposition again surfaced. In April the discontinuance of the embargo 
subdued discontent, but by no means ended it. The intensity of dissent 
fluctuated during the spring and summer of 1814, and in October Massa-
5 
chusetts Federalists called for the Hartford Convention. The most con-
stant and vehement opposition to the war and to the Madison admin-
istration that ever occurred filled the remainder of the year. 
Peace negotiations took place at Ghent during the same period. Over 
a year of continual efforts by the American government had passed be-
fore the conference finally began in August, 1814. The American com-
missioners perceived their position to be weakened by military defeats, 
a near-bankrupt treasury, and a divided nation. As Bradford Perkins 
notes, they also faced an enemy who was neither defeated nor thought 
himself to be beaten.1 We now know that this was a rare experience for 
American diplomats, for the War of 1812 was one of the few wars where 
the United States had to negotiate for peace rather than to dictate it 
to a conquered enemy. Under such circumstances peace negotiators 
especially resent any sign of discord within their own country, because 
to their minds it undermines their demands and necessitates concessions. 
They presume that the enemy will take advantage of internal divisions 
and will be more reluctant to compromise, thereby prolonging war. 
Such were the views of the American commissioners at Ghent. 
When a treaty eventually was signed on December 24, it was as good 
as Albert Gallatin considered possible; but he claimed that New England 
dissent had been an obstacle. "The attitude taken by the State of Massa-
chusetts and the appearances in some of the neighbouring States," Gal-
latin lamented to Secretary of State James Monroe, "had a most unfavor-
able effect.'' Whether his judgment was accurate is open to question. 
Long the target of Federalist abuse, Gallatin was predisposed to exag-
gerate the influence of his political opponents. He frequently had been 
attacked for his economic policies as well as for his foreign birth. At 
the time of his nomination to the original peace commission in 1813, 
criticism of his management of the Treasury was particularly virulent. 
Political dissent having made his tasks no easier at home, it is under-
standable that Gallatin would project his experience to the situation 
abroad, and months before negotiations began he did so. If vocal Fed-
eralists had not swayed a majority in America, he argued, they had 
had no difficulty convincing the newspaper-reading British public that 
the United States' declaration of war was unwarranted. Although he 
did not believe that the Cabinet held such sentiments, he feared that 
because of public opinion strenuous efforts were required on its part to 
make peace. This was especially true, he contended, since the Cabinet 
shared the thought that "a continuance of the war would produce a 
separation of the Union, and perhaps a return of the New England 
States to the mother-country." In a letter to fellow delegate Henry Clay 
notifying him that the end of the European war would free additional 
British troops for American service, Gallatin reiterated these points and 
added that "above all our own divisions and the hostile attitude of the 
Eastern States give room to apprehend that a continuance of the war 
might prove vitally fatal to the United States." Based on this concern of 
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increased British strength and of the effects New England dissent might 
have on British policy, he advised James Monroe to modify the com-
mission's instructions. In particular he thought that the resolution of 
the issue of impressment should be removed as a sine qua non for 
peace. The "most favorable" terms he hoped for were the status quo 
ante helium. The Madison administration came to the same conclusion, 
provided that an article be included in the treaty stipulating that 
separate negotiations concerning impressment and commerce would fol-
low shortly. Almost immediately it retreated further by instructing that 
the article was preferable but not necessary. 
Gallatin was not the only American commissioner who, before nego-
tiations began, was alarmed by what he interpreted to be the effects of 
dissent. John Quincy Adams shared the sentiment. Adams, a former 
Federalist, had substantial cause for grievances and for suspicions about 
his prior associates and fellow New Englanders and possessed a tempera-
ment ready to conjure the worst at the slightest offense. His dislike and 
distrust for such Federalists as Timothy Pickering had arisen during the 
intraparty skirmishes of his father's administration and had intensified 
as the party became more narrowly sectional. He was appalled by the 
separatists of 1804 and attributed similar motives to those who opposed 
Jefferson's embargo. Following his shift from the Federalist Party to 
the Republican Party in 1808, he continued to view Federalists as 
potential traitors. On June 29, 1812, unaware that war had been de-
clared, he wrote: "The present time is less favorable for the British 
intrigue to dismember our Union than that [1809 when the Canadian 
agent, John Henry, was in New England] was, but whenever we have a 
war with England, we shall have to contend against an internal struggle 
of the same spirit." Learning of the war and of the accompanying Fed-
eralist dissent, he thought his beliefs confirmed. Not even Russian winters 
could cool his passions, nor distance make his heart grow fonder. Even 
so, he considered the war to be unnecessary since the Orders in Council 
had been revoked, and he too hoped for an early peace. His desire for 
peace, however, did not alter his attitude towards the Federalists. Adams 
interpreted their demands for peace as an attempt to regain political 
power; and although his apprehension of disunion wavered, the thought 
lingered on. 
The last member of the delegation appointed to negotiate under 
Russian mediation, Federalist Senator James A. Bayard of Delaware, 
held a different view of anti-war activity. Bayard disapproved of the 
war but did not sympathize with the British. Yet out of desperation he 
had thought that "the experiment [of war] may be worth what it will 
cost to have it determined whether we are better-of[f] in being at peace 
or war with her. This will nearly settle the question whether the Feds. 
or demos, have pursued the wiser course." Bayard was appointed to 
the peace commission to appease dissenting Federalists, and at least 
one of his friends cautioned him that he might be used to provide 
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legitimacy for a fraudulent mission.2 Bayard thought differently. "If 
the négociation should fail (the worst event which can happen)," he 
reasoned, "the nation can sustain no injury from my having been a 
member of the mission. / can only be called upon to attest the true 
grounds upon which the négociation may have terminated, and it 
certainly will be important to the country to be informed of the truth 
upon the subject." 
When the British refused to accept Russian mediation but agreed 
to direct negotiations, Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell were added to 
the American commission. Clay, an ambitious westerner, was a strong 
supporter of the war and an equally adamant desparager of those who op-
posed it. Early in the conflict, he attempted to rally public opinion against 
dissenters, and he shrewdly picked as the springboard for his comments 
one of the more extreme Federalist newspapers, the Boston Repertory. 
On June 26, 1812, the Repertory printed an inflammatory article. It 
asked its readers whether they would prefer to be "the slaves of the 
slaves of Bonaparte" or freemen. Should they choose the latter, re-
sistance and separation were implied as proper courses of action. Clay 
introduced the article in the administration newspaper, the National 
Intelligencer, with an extended preface. He first attacked the editor 
of the Repertory for suggesting resistance against a free government 
under which "every blessing of which we are susceptible is enjoyed." 
He then let his imagination roam further. What if a "few ambitious 
demagogues" should try to subvert the Constitution by force, he pon-
dered. "The virtuous people of that State" would quell it. What if 
"these leaders" should be assisted by "the myrmidons of a foreign power," 
he questioned next. The state militia should be competent; but if need 
be, they would be helped by "myriads of freemen" from other states. But 
what if "misguided faction[s]" in the New England states actually 
achieved disunion, he asked, allowing his "improbable suppositions" to 
develop to their fullest. This he thought too preposterous for con-
sideration; and thus hoping to have discredited the Repertory and, more 
importantly, Federalist dissenters, he presented the article. Understand-
ably Federalists were displeased with Clay's appointment as well as 
with Russell's, but prior to negotiations Clay tended to disregard them 
as a real threat. He believed them to be merely playing "a game of 
swaggering and gasconade." Apparently not even the warning that 
Eastern discontent would lead the British to demand recognition of 
impressment persuaded him differently. 
Jonathan Russell was unquestionably the least distinguished of an 
otherwise highly competent delegation. Even though he was a New 
Englander, he continually supported Clay rather than Adams. Whether 
he opposed or was even concerned about dissent prior to negotiations is 
undetermined, but in the midst of the talks his attitude became clear. 
"I will not forgive the man who indulges the prejudice of party in 
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times like these/' he wrote. "All must rally now in defense of their 
country." 
Such were the attitudes of the American commissioners when they 
began negotiations on August 6. Gallatin and Adams expected dissent 
to be detrimental to their efforts while Bayard and Clay anticipated no 
difficulty from that quarter. Russell's preconception is unknown. 
Any fear of failure they may have had must have been excited when 
the British revealed their objectives. They demanded most of the terri-
tory now composing the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin as an Indian buffer state and presented it as a sine qua non. 
They sought a revision of the boundaries between the United States and 
Canada. They denied the previous American rights of fishing in British 
waters and of drying catches on British shores. Finally, they desired 
military control of the Great Lakes. Worst of all, the British offered 
little room for compromise. It appeared likely that the conference 
would terminate unsuccessfully by the end of the first month. 
The American delegation were neither willing to capitulate to these 
terms nor instructed on all issues. Thus they debated with the British 
commissioners, waited for further instructions, contemplated their de-
parture and hoped for a treaty they could accept. On at least one occa-
sion, Bayard resorted to tactics of his own. Following a joint dinner of 
both commissions, he sought out the chief British negotiator, Henry 
Goulburn, for a private conference. Bayard argued that the terms of-
fered by Great Britain were not only damaging to "all prospects of 
peace," but also to the Federalist Party. It was to Britain's advantage to 
support the Federalists, and this could best be accomplished by peace. 
Moreover, he assured Goulburn, there was no need to fear for Canada. 
Goulburn was unimpressed and suspected that negotiations would be 
discontinued. 
As disheartened as the Americans were, they were reluctant to break 
off the talks. Should that event become unavoidable, the commissioners 
unanimously agreed that they must do so on a point which would unite 
the American people in support of the war. To put it differently, the 
delegation to a man had become concerned about dissent and its pos-
sible consequences. Rather than intensify internal disharmony, they 
decided to continue discussions until war protestors should concur that 
termination was proper. 
The Indian question, therefore, became increasingly perplexing 
when the British reduced their sine qua non from a demand for a buffer 
state to an insistence that the peace include the restoration of Indian 
rights, privileges and territories as of 1811. Gallatin speculated that 
such an article would be rejected by the Madison administration "but 
that it was a bad point for us to break off the negotiation upon." Further-
more, the British were so committed on this issue, Gallatin reasoned, that 
"it was impossible for them further to retreat," and consequently Amer-
ican acceptance might be mandatory. Subsequent knowledge of the 
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British capture of Washington, D.C., made a decision no easier. When 
the British modified their proposal to a reciprocal article which did 
not include Indian tribes as parties in the peace but was an ultimatum, 
the American commissioners accepted it. Gallatin explained his own 
motivation by asserting that "having little hope of peace, I thought it 
much more favorable, with respect to public opinion in the eastern part 
of the Union, that we should break on other grounds, and particularly 
that of territorial rights, than on that of Indian pacification. . . . " 
Almost simultaneous to the resolution of the Indian question, James 
Madison performed a clever act which affected British attitudes; he 
published the diplomatic dispatches as well as the June instructions. The 
intent behind the maneuver must have been primarily to quell dissent 
by showing British territorial ambitions. The result, however, was an 
increased discontent, but in Great Britain rather than in the United 
States. 
Despite the disclosure of the dispatches, Federalist opposition to the 
war continued to mount. On October 15 the Massachusetts legislature 
decided to send invitations to the other New England states for the 
ostensible purposes of deliberating "upon the subjects of their public 
grievances and concerns,'' of devising plans for protecting New England, 
and of considering whether an attempt should be made to amend the 
Constitution. The convention was to be held at Hartford, beginning 
December 15. 
Few were certain what would happen. The major question in many 
minds was whether separation was the real objective. Madison for 
some time had feared that it was. Following an interview a day before 
Massachusetts decided to call the Convention, William Wirt observed 
that Madison's mind was "full of the New England sedition." Among 
his concerns were the effects such actions might have on the British. 
"You are not mistaken in viewing the conduct of the Eastern States 
as the source of our greatest difficulties in carrying on the war," Madison 
wrote a few weeks before the Convention began, "as it certainly is the 
greatest, if not the sole, inducement with the enemy to persevere in it." 
By late November the American commissioners in general were not 
as apprehensive as Madison. Perhaps the favorable turn of events at 
Ghent lessened what alarm they might have had. John Quincy Adams, 
however, was not one to take the proposed Hartford Convention lightly. 
He wrote, "how fearfully does this mad and wicked project of national 
suicide bear upon my heart and mind, when I have the profoundest 
conviction that if we now fail to obtain peace, it will be owing entirely 
to this act of the Massachusetts legislature." With just the questions of 
the fisheries and of ownership of Moose Island remaining, Adams thought 
that only the "prospect of the dissolution of our Union" encouraged the 
British to continue the war for such otherwise meager gains. 
A similar, though less passionate and pessimistic, judgment was made 
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by Albert Gallatin. In understated terms, he considered it ''extraordi-
nary'' that a peaceful conclusion of negotiations "depended solely upon 
two points, in which the people of the State of Massachusetts alone were 
interested." To sacrifice them, he held, would be to give support to 
the Federalists and to the movement for separation, and therefore he 
argued against British demands. Should the United States be willing to 
allow British navigation of the Mississippi, it appeared that fishing rights 
and possession of Moose Island could be retained; but Henry Clay was in 
no mood to conciliate men whom he considered traitors at the expense 
of western interests. He pointedly warned the other commissioners "that 
there might be a party for separation at some future day in the Western 
States, too." 
At this juncture, negotiations might have terminated because of 
disagreements among the American commissioners—disagreements in-
tensified by New England dissent. On the one side, Gallatin, Adams, 
and apparently Bayard were willing to grant navigation rights in ex-
change for concessions affecting dissident Massachusetts. On the other, 
Clay adamantly refused to approve such an event, and Russell apparently 
agreed. Clay preferred to leave both the fisheries and the Mississippi out 
of the treaty and went so far as to suggest this in private conversation 
with one of the British commissioners, Lord Gambier. 
Omission eventually was the final solution. Neither the fisheries nor 
the Mississippi was mentioned in the treaty, and Moose Island was left 
to arbitration. The War of 1812 ended on the basis of status quo ante 
helium. Throughout negotiations the American delegation had assumed 
that dissent in the United States influenced British decisions and had 
acted accordingly. Along with preconceptions and interpretations of 
British maneuvers a reason for the assumption was the incorporation in 
the pro-ministry British press of Federalist acts and speeches. 
Pro-ministry newspapers, such as the London Times and the London 
Sun, were extremely belligerent and used American examples whenever 
possible to strengthen their case. Shortly before negotiations began the 
Times, for instance, claimed that "the feeling of the sounder and better 
part of the American people is strongly with us." The Sun advised the 
British ministry to treat the United States punitively at Ghent; and as 
if to show that harsh measures were possible as well as desirable, it 
followed the comments with "communications" from America that the 
Federalists were seeking to impeach Madison. And so it went. When the 
threatened island of Nantucket declared itself neutral, the potential 
consequences appeared enormous to both papers. The Times had "little 
doubt" that should Lord Hill's army be seen "in the heartland of the 
country" half the United States would follow Nantucket's lead while 
the Sun thought it should be made known to the Madison administration 
and "to the world [which certainly included the British Cabinet], that 
the assurance of the unity of these States is very frail. . . ." There were 
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few weeks during the first three months of negotiations when notice of 
American dissent was not made in the pro-administration press. 
The tone shifted dramatically, however, after it was learned that 
Madison had published the diplomatic dispatches. Reference to Amer-
ican disharmony temporarily was dropped. "We are told that the terms 
proposed by the British Commissioners have united all parties in the 
United States against us," the Sun explained to its readers. "So be it." 
The bellicose Times interpreted the new-found "unity" to be the "con-
sequence of talking, instead of acting." Demands not enforced by ade-
quate power had brought about the turn of events. "But why treat at 
all with Mr. MADISON?", it rhetorically questioned. 
Upon hearing of the call for the Hartford Convention, the Times 
maintained its militancy but once again welcomed American dissent. 
As late as December 20, four days before the treaty was signed, it sug-
gested that Britain treat separately with New England; and when peace 
came, it brought no satisfaction to that newspaper. The Sun was more 
reluctant to reacknowledge Federalist opposition. The Massachusetts 
resolutions condemning Madison were brushed aside as not being 
"worthy of being inserted at length, to the exclusion of more enter-
taining matter." Not until December 23 did the Sun re-embrace New 
England Federalism. 
The chief opposition newspaper, the London Morning Chronicle, 
also may have led the American commissioners to assume that dishar-
mony in the United States was influencing British policy and at least 
must have reinforced their awareness that American divisiveness was 
recognized in London. The newspaper and its supporters opposed the 
war not because they thought it unjust but because they believed what-
ever gains might be made would be outweighed by the expense incurred 
and by the disruption of trade. Moreover, they considered American 
disunity advantageous to the British in peace or war and therefore de-
manded that British terms for peace be moderate so that American 
wounds would not heal. "A lamentable thing," the Morning Chronicle 
argued, "if we should unite the whole population of America against us 
by our exorbitant demands, and thereby make known to them their own 
strength." 
Whatever the effect of British newspapers on the perceptions of the 
American delegation and regardless of the commissioners' predispositions, 
there can be no doubt that dissent in the United States influenced British 
tactics at Ghent. Early in the negotiations when British objectives still 
included an Indian buffer state, boundary readjustment, and military 
dominance on the Great Lakes, the British attempted to justify these 
demands by charging that the United States, "of late years at least," 
sought to annex Canada. They supported the accusation partly with 
evidence coming from New England, in particular from Governor John 
Cotton Smith of Connecticut. The intent, presumably, was to confront 
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the American commissioners with American evidence and to make it 
difficult for them to break negotiations on a point accepted by American 
dissenters.3 This same tactic was used a month later, on October 8. 
Again the British claimed that the United States wanted Canada, and 
again New England evidence (in this case, a remonstrance from the 
Massachusetts legislature) was used. Late in the negotiations American 
opposition must have been in mind as well when the British denied 
previous American fishing rights and when they claimed Moose Island. 
No other issues at that time remained to be resolved but those which 
affected New England, especially Massachusetts. The American delega-
tion, once more burdened by Federalist dissent, correctly interpreted 
British motivation in this instance. 
A variation of the tactic may be seen in a communication from Earl 
Bathurst, head of the Colonial Office, to Goulburn earlier in the year. 
Having learned of military success at Washington, Bathurst attempted to 
capitalize on the Federalist desire for power. He instructed Goulburn to 
inform any Federalist with whom he might converse that an immediate 
peace would be advantageous to the Federalist Party. Recent events led 
to the conclusion that the Madison administration would be driven from 
office and would be replaced by Federalists. Expecting further victories, 
Bathurst contended that a harsher peace would be demanded in three 
months; should a Federalist administration sign, "they might become 
unpopular. . . . " Events, however, developed differently. 
Yet although American dissent clearly influenced British tactics, it 
had little impact on determining particular British objectives and had 
no effect on policy decisions. In none of the three major stages of policy 
during peace negotiations can its consequences be seen. The British 
initially sought a territorial re-arrangement which would protect Canada 
from future American threats. They also desired to protect Britain's 
Indian allies and to satisfy a touch of vindictiveness. In October British 
policy makers shifted and decided to settle on the basis of uti possidetis. 
They established their final position in November when they determined 
that status quo ante helium was acceptable. Quite clearly, British de-
mands diminished as negotiations continued. At the same time, dissent 
in the United States was intensifying. This alone should demonstrate 
how little American protest entered the minds of the British leadership. 
Other evidence also is available. 
Only infrequently was American dissent noted in the correspondence 
of British officials, and then it was not necessarily presented as being 
beneficial. At one time, for example, chief negotiator Henry Goulburn 
commented that among the few things he had learned at the conference 
was that "the Federalists are quite as inveterate enemies to us as the 
Madisonians." The head of the Colonial Office, Earl Bathurst, similarly 
distrusted the Federalists but hoped somehow they might be useful. 
"I make no doubt they hate us," he wrote of them, "but their hate to 
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the opposite party may lead them, very unintentionally, to give us some 
assistance." Prime Minister Liverpool certainly was aware that there 
was disaffection in the United States for the Madison administration, but 
it in no way influenced his decisions. His one hope was that dissent would 
incline Madison towards peace, presumably on British terms. 
Not even when the British ministry learned of the call for the Hart-
ford Convention nor when they were led to believe that New England 
separation was imminent did their attitudes shift. They had decided to 
treat for peace on the basis of status quo ante helium, and apparently 
only an American refusal to accept those terms would have affected their 
commitment. This was evident late in the negotiations on December 13 
when Bathurst was informed that Massachusetts allegedly wished to 
sign a separate peace. A self-identified "agent" of Massachusetts Governor 
Caleb Strong had given this information to British officials in New 
Brunswick, and they had relayed it to Bathurst.4 Bathurst responded 
immediately; but rather than change policy, he ordered that in the 
event of the collapse of the negotiations or of the refusal of Madison to 
ratify a treaty a separate peace would be arranged, provided the agent 
identified himself with official documents. More significantly, Liverpool 
favored the same course if the treaty should not be ratified. 
If opposition to the War of 1812 had any influence on British policy, 
it was British opposition, not American. The Morning Chronicle was 
not the only voice of discontent in Britain. Speeches in both houses of 
Parliament continued to condemn the war. No one suggested that British 
involvement had been unjustified, but some thought that there was no 
need to prolong it; possible territorial acquisitions were not worth the 
expense. Anger also was expressed at military ineptitude, particularly 
after Plattsburg. 
The British ministry were wary of such dissatisfaction. Foreign Secre-
tary Castlereagh advised Liverpool to "call Parliament at such a period 
as will give you the means of avoiding discussion, especially on the 
American question. . . ." Bathurst contended that "there are many 
political reasons to make us anxious to conclude a Peace if we can do it 
on proper Terms/' British dissent even may have contributed to the 
decision to end the war on the basis of status quo ante helium. Liverpool 
included fear of opposition to increased taxes for continuing the war as 
one of his reasons for concluding peace; neither Bathurst nor Goulburn 
did, however.5 At any rate British dissent, at most, had slight impact 
on this decision, and American disaffection had none. 
In short, Albert Gallatin exaggerated the influence of American dis-
sent on British decisions. He, like his fellow commissioners, was led 
astray by preconceptions, British newspapers and British diplomatic 
tactics. The critical element determining the impact of dissent on peace 
negotiations was the military situation. Had Britain been defeated, dis-
sent would have been little more than an irritation—a mere domestic 
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problem—to the American delegation. But confronted by a military 
stalemate, the American commissioners incorrectly concluded that British 
officials considered themselves strengthened by the words and actions of 
American dissenters. The British, in fact, were as distrustful of dissenters 
as were American officials; and, as a result, American opposition to the 
War of 1812 was felt primarily by American negotiators, and it was only 
American policy which was affected. Conversely, British dissent affected 
only British officials, and there is no evidence that Americans considered 
such opposition while forming their decisions. Dissent on neither side 
of the Atlantic prolonged the war but rather it shortened the conflict 
by making negotiators more circumspect about breaking discussions and 
more willing to achieve peace. 
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